

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. EXO	-5-	9/19
2. DDIS STAT	B	9/15
3. DIS		R
4. [ ] I honestly believe this is telling Sec. how to such eggs		R
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

This is a pertinent item that looks worthy of consideration by Security and Personnel. Seems that the DCI MAG should consider this as a subject for study and recommendation in time for guidance on procedures before the onslaught of new hires next spring, too.

STAT

Want me to raise this with Security or — ?

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

1. 3. Item worthwhile to raise in security. f

Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

☆ GPO : 1981 O - 361-529 (148)

STAT

C/O RP



- you may wish  
to discuss this  
further



DP/OLS

STAT



file:

16 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Information Services, DDA

FROM: Chief, Classification Review Division

SUBJECT: The Security Threat From Temporary Employees

1. The Classification Review Division, which reviews Summaries of Agency Employment (SAEs) for non-DO personnel who have never served abroad or under cover, reviewed [ ] SAEs in July and [ ] during August 1983. The great majority of these people were leaving for reasons other than retirement and many of them after temporary or short periods of employment. This includes Summer Help, Academics in Residence, various type of Fellows, etc. This means that in any given year we may have a relatively large number of people who come to CIA, work on matters of Agency interest for a few months, and then leave.

STAT

2. There are legitimate reasons for using these people and justification is no doubt provided in each case. But the large number of these persons passing through CIA, in itself, represents a threat to CIA security. We realize that these people are cleared to the level equivalent to the classification they are to have access to but such limited clearances could miss things of security importance. Far worse, these people leave with little experience in handling classified information and no doubt in many cases a lack of a true understanding of the security practices that are necessary to protect Agency equities. This is reflected by the fact that we delete items from about one-third of the SAEs that we review. This usually is organizational data below the Office level that is classified according to [ ] the names of personnel still employed by CIA, and some operational information such as targetting data.

STAT

3. From our vantage point, we are not able to do more than outline what could represent a vulnerable area for CIA. A deeper assessment of the potential problem, if it is indeed felt warranted, must be left to others.

STAT



Chief,  
Classification Review Division